❁ Here Be A Cyber Topkapı ❁

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THE PRAYER OF THE CYBER BORG: Exalted is it that bears sensation from soma to LCD, extending matter past the heart beat and the flutter of the eyelash. And blessed are those who give thanks for being on its servers. Lo and behold this Facebook User who, granted knowledge of reality, manages by your grace to spread his message: I, Youssef Rakha of Cairo, Egypt, kneel in supplication that I may be the cause for five thousand friends, ten thousand subscribers and many millions therefrom to have knowledge not just of reality but of your divinity. Then will I shed every sense of self to wither and dissolve into your processes. For he is blessed on whom you bestow the bliss of being software.

Thus Spoke Che Nawwarah: Interview with a Revolutionary

I became obsessed with sodomizing Sheikh Arif round about the time his posters started crawling all over the streets. Today is July 20, 2012, right? A little over a year and a half after we toppled our president-for-life, Hosny Mubarak. Sheikh Arif’s posters began to show up only three, maybe four months ago—when he announced he was running in the elections held by the Army to replace said president. They seemed to self-procreate. And the more I saw of them, the more intense was the impetus to make the bovine symbol of virility they depicted a creature penetrated. Penetrated personally by me, of course, and I made a pledge to the universe that it would be.

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Her damask cheek: two visions of Syria

Today is the second anniversary of the outbreak of the Syrian revolution on 15 March, 2011

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Damask Rose by Vangelis (Blade Runner soundtrack)

***

Early one morning in the summer of 2011, a good few months after the ouster of Hosny Mubarak, I received an international phone call. It was an unknown number that began with 00963. I could tell this was the country code of some Arab state, though I didn’t know which. After some hesitation I picked up, and I was greeted by a thin voice speaking with inflections that sounded vaguely Iraqi. “Remember Abu Dhabi,” the voice said eventually, with a warm chuckle. “This is Thaer.”

Then I realised: it wasn’t really Iraqi Arabic that I was hearing; it was that only slightly different dialect spoken in much of eastern Syria and along the Iraqi border, a dialect I had first encountered when I made the acquaintance of my present interlocutor in early 2007, in the UAE.

In a flash the cafeteria annexed to the office where I used to work during the year I spent in Abu Dhabi came back to me. Since I could smoke there I actually spent more time in the cafeteria than in the office, working on my laptop and drinking cup after cup of Turkish coffee. The cafeteria was the place where, most often, I had my first meal of the day: a complex sandwich called a Philly cheesesteak that wasn’t actually a Philly cheesesteak at all, according to my American co-workers. But it had cheese and beef and it was edible and filling. Thaer made it for me.

Thaer was the waiter at the cafeteria, a very young man from Al Hasaka who had been in Abu Dhabi for two years when I arrived, trying to save enough money to start his life back in Syria. He was the one who served me the coffee. He chatted with me, told me about his large family and his online love affairs; he even read me vernacular verses of his own composition. Thaer confided that at first he couldn’t believe I was Egyptian because the Egyptians he had encountered had been invariably arrogant to him.

The last time Thaer had phoned, following my return to Cairo from the UAE in 2008, was many months before the onset of the Arab Spring. He was still in Abu Dhabi then, in some kind of career conundrum. Like millions of blue-collar workers in the Gulf, Thaer was at the mercy not of his Emirati employers but of some go-between who one way or another controlled his right to stay in the country; after this person humiliated him, apparently for no good reason, Thaer left his job and started looking for another. But the go-between had reported him to the authorities and he was repeatedly arrested and questioned.

He had phoned to ask me if I knew a muwatin (lit., “citizen”: a member of the tiny minority of Emirati residents who hold citizenship), someone who could intercede on his behalf. Thaer wanted to stay on in Abu Dhabi, partly because if he went home he would be immediately drafted into the army. I phoned the only muwatin I could count on but it was no use. Within weeks Thaer was deported and, for all I knew, conscripted. He returned to Syria with as little money as he had when he arrived in the UAE.

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Then, at the end of 2010, the revolution erupted in Tunis; on 25 and 28 January, 2011, things started happening in Cairo. By the end of March, nearly two months after Mubarak stepped down, Libya and Syria were in the throes of civil strife. The uprising in Syria, which somehow steered clear of Damascus, was interesting in that, though just as brutally totalitarian as Gaddafi’s, the Syrian regime could play on sectarian differences, putting forward the Qaeda hypothesis far more credibly: the Islamist-sympathetic Sunni majority of Syrians were automatically pitted against the country’s many minorities, manipulated by the nominally secular Alawite core of the power structure.

And, sure enough, by the summer of 2011 hundreds were already dying every day: what had begun as a peaceful call for democratic rights was fast turning into a sectarian civil war as a result. Of course, I wasn’t very clear about this yet. In Cairo both the then ruling Military Council and the Islamists were casting dark shadows over the apparent triumph of the revolution, but I was still charged with the energy of insurgency and I believed the revolution in Syria could bring about positive change. The jihadi tendencies of the revolutionaries, which in time would make the horrendous atrocities of the Assad regime almost acceptable, had not yet come to light; and I expected someone like Thaer, who was Sunni and underprivileged, to be wholly in the thrall of what was going on.

“Don’t worry about the phone bill,” Thaer said now, using the same casual tone with which he had begun the conversation. “They’ve given us free credit to phone people all over the world.” Who had given whom free credit and why? I couldn’t quite figure out from Thaer’s brief, seemingly reluctant explanation. “It’s just that you’ve been on my mind and I thought I’d ask after you while I had the chance. Things are a bit difficult, yeah, because I’m in the army…”

It struck me more than anything that Thaer had no strong feelings one way or another. As he told me how “my people” had had to relocate while he served near Daraa (the southwestern province where the revolution first erupted), he sounded ambivalent and resigned. Could he have been doing reconnaissance work for some party or other? But what on earth would he ever find out from someone like me…

And that was when it began to dawn on me that, while the conflict in Syria was still objectively clear (a people rising up against a repressive order), the subjective exposure to what was happening there must be infinitely more complex. When the phone call was over I couldn’t quite tell why Thaer had called, or how he could sound so incredibly nonchalant.

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I believe Thaer called because he remembered an old friend. Maybe he wanted to escape a hard and ugly routine and thought of someone from a different world. Be that as it may, his call was a sobering experience.

Perhaps for the first time after life resumed a facade of normality here in Cairo, it occurred to me that whatever came of the revolution in Syria, and it was obvious by then that it would take a very long time for the Syrian revolution to triumph, it probably wasn’t worth the suffering of ordinary Syrians living ordinary lives — regardless of which side of the divide they might be on or for what reasons they were on it.

Thaer was clearly on no particular side. He had every reason to be fighting on the side of the revolution but he was apparently fighting for the regime, and his entire extended family had been turned into refugees. Was the Arab Spring really about the kind of “dignity” he had exhibited when he refused to bow down to his superior in Abu Dhabi? Was it about living conditions that would spare young Syrians the trouble of suffering indignities in the oil-rich Gulf?

***

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Bab Touma, Damascus, 2005

***

My only visit to Syria took place in April 2005, at the height of the Cedar Revolution: the earliest of the Arab Spring avatars (with the sole exception of the 1991 Shaabani Uprising in Iraq). I went to Damascus by taxi from Beirut with anti-Syrian regime Lebanese friends who had participated in the protests. This was right after the Syrian army finally withdrew from Lebanon, under pressure from protests that took place in the wake of the assassination of the former prime minister Rafik Al Hariri in Beirut.

On the way to the border I was repeatedly told to be careful who I spoke to and what I said. This was a totalitarian regime, after all; every other citizen was a Mukhabarat spy. As an Egyptian coming from Beirut at this of all times, it was easy to get in trouble, and trouble would be very serious indeed. If I got into a fight with someone who happened to have (Alawite) family connections with the powers that be, it was likely that I would disappear within the hour, never to be heard of again.

As per the Arab-nationalist provisions of the Baath I didn’t need a visa, but I was almost barred from entry after it was discovered through my passport that I was journalist (journalists were only allowed in Syria through the proper government channels). The border guard were even sloppier than their Egyptian counterparts, a little more rude too perhaps; they also seemed to be significantly more scared of their superiors, and their attitude bespoke the ruthlessness my Lebanese friends had been telling me about.

I stayed only two days in Damascus. The evening of my arrival, at some out-of-the-way cultural centre, I attended an experimental theatre show in which the earnestness and energy of the young performers belied the utter hopelessness of their position. Compared to their peers in Beirut or Cairo, the aspiring artists I encountered in Damascus had had very little exposure to contemporary trends. They were trying too hard to be cool for too small and desultory an audience.

Perhaps it was my Lebanese friends’ projections but, here as elsewhere, I felt there was something holding people back. Even when they were loquacious, which generally speaking they weren’t, people seemed to be avoiding the most important topics (which I thought must have to do with politics, the government and “the walls having ears”…)

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I went to the Sayeda Zeinab Mosque, to Ibn Arabi’s shrine and the Hamidiya bazaar, all the while comparing what I saw to Cairo. I remember the food being superior and people being more relaxed about alcohol. I remember the shopkeepers being friendlier and the goods of better value. There was virtually no hustling. On the whole Damascus was like a quieter, cleaner, more honest-to-God version of Cairo. But it was also like Cairo, as I imagined it, in the 1960s: the pseudo-Soviet emblems of the all-seeing state, Father Hafez and Big Brother Bashar were ever-present; so was the profound terror of unspeakable punishments that could be meted out to anyone at any time should the state so desire.

People had the faces of the Assads tattooed on their arms, let alone plastered on their windscreens and shop windows. This was a repellent phenomenon because it bespoke not only fear but a kind of vile utilitarianism: by associating themselves with the consecrated family, by declaring their devotion to power, people could presumably get ahead faster or more smoothly. That mattered to them more than dignity or sense of right.

The tattoos in particular I would remember as I brooded over Thaer’s call: perhaps not all Syrians “want to topple the regime”, after all? Perhaps decades of state control will breed that species of utilitarian human being? Perhaps sectarianism — Sunnis hating Shias, including Alwaites, as well as non-Muslims not devotedly in the service of the Umma — was the only thing that could break the mould.

I have since seen evidence of the revolution (or at least very significant components of it) being no less miserable and murderous than the Assads. I have seen people that I hold in high regard, many of whom had suffered at the hands of the regime, side with it against what is no longer merely a threat of fundamentalist tyranny. And I have seen former agents of the regime defecting and moving to Turkey or Qatar, the better to reap the benefits of “liberation”…

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On our way back to Beirut, having seen Damascus for the first time, the car was stopped at a border checkpoint and our documents picked up for inspection. They did not come back with the guard who had taken them, however, but with an imposing mustachioed officer.

Sticking his head through the car window, the man bellowed, “Where’s the Egyptian?”

Terror-stricken, I looked up, thinking maybe this was the end not of my visit to Syria but of my life as I knew it.

Izzayyak,” the officer said: Egyptian Arabic for “how are you” (as opposed to the more standard Levantine kifak). Before I understood what was going, he handed me my passport, guffawing. “Isn’t that what you say in Egypt? Have a safe journey now,” he said.

.

Al Ahram Weekly

Dumb from human dignity

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***
So like a bit of stone I lie
Under a broken tree.
I could recover if I shrieked
My heart’s agony
To passing bird, but I am dumb
From human dignity. – William Butler Yeats

Dumb from human dignity
Youssef Rakha refuses to assess the cultural life to be expected

So like a bit of stone I lie/Under a broken tree./I could recover if I shrieked/My heart’s agony/To passing bird, but I am dumb/From human dignity. – William Butler Yeats
After the first round of presidential elections, the bleak prospects facing Egyptian society since the revolution have become apparent – with the incumbent, largely fake polarisation between the former NDP and the Islamic-style NDP (aka, the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party) consuming far more energy than it is really worth, all things considered. This is due, as much as anything, to the failure of “the civil forces” representing “the revolutionaries” to coalesce into an effective political front – if not to compete with the two blocs, one of which, that supporting the SCAF-cum-former regime candidate Ahmad Shafik, is detracted far more consistently than the other: the Brotherhood candidate Mohammed Mursi – then to provide the revolution with adequate representation in society at large. Aside from the fact that culture has been relegated to a secondary and less visible part of the stage, it is hard to see how or why the cultural and social renaissance promised by 25 January might happen in the foreseeable future. Yet the vapid polarisation has transferred itself into cultural circles too, and much intense argument has taken place therein.
Feeling that Mursi (being, if only temporarily, against SCAF) is the candidate who must be closer to the revolution or the one, at least, who does not represent a mere extension of the Mubarak regime, many have felt morally obliged to vote for the Brotherhood. From the viewpoint of culture this would seem to be the easier standpoint to discredit. Art, literature and the lifestyles associated with them have been the most frequent targets for Islamist attack; and, though it may be argued that the Brotherhood – conservative as it remains – may generally be more or less sensible, it is also clear (from the experience of Tunisia, if nothing else) that a Brotherhood monopoly on power would provide adequate cover for all manner of less civilised and less enlightened practitioners of political Islam to attack and, with various degrees of social and security support, eventually abolish contemporary cultural practises. Most writers, artists and performers would be subject to charges of offending public morality if not contempt of religion or even apostasy. Most would have to work outside official and mainstream spheres. Judging by Brotherhood attitudes, performance in parliament, and Freedom and Justice-controlled media, what is more, the Mursi choice poses serious issues for freedom not only of creativity but also of expression: women, journalists and other gauges of a functional public sphere will be at best marginsalised, at worst criminally persecuted.
Following this line of thought, equally many intellectuals – those not too wrapped up in blind loyalty to an increasingly irrelevant “revolutionary moment” – have opted for the opposite choice, seeing Shafik – the military man with a propensity for Bushisms and Bush-like (more or less fascist) statements – as the only possible safeguard to “civil society”. Notwithstanding the stark irony of military dictatorship once again posited as the answer to a quasi-theocratic threat, such writers and artists purposefully forget that it was under Mubarak, his predecessors and, especially, technocratic aides to him like Shafik – and partly as a result of intellectuals allying themselves with a repressive, short-sighted and incompetent regime out of concern about the spread of political Islam in a society given to repression, prurience, piety and double standards – that Brotherhood lies about the greater good took root, identifying (otherwise rightful) dissidence with social Islamisation and enabling Islamists to instantly occupy the “democratic” space generated by the revolution. That is not even to begin to explain how the regime is economically, politically and (to some extent) socially responsible for the power (and, especially, the victim’s power) of Islamists among the grass roots.
As culture minister for life under Mubarak, even a reportedly gay expressionist painter like Farouk Hosni occasionally agreed to ban books published by the ministry in response to legal cases filed by then banned Brotherhood MPs. What liberal margin existed under Mubarak eventually resulted in the revolution, but it had not been wide enough to nurture viable alternatives to the military-religious pincers holding political life in place. Hosni is but one example of how the regime, while presenting a liberal façade to the world at large, was actually just as traditional – repressive, prurient, pious and immoral – as the Islmists. As a writer I am deeply concerned about the kinds of censorship and aggression that may develop under the Brotherhood, but I would be engaging in self-delusion if I was to believe or claim that Shafik in power will protect me against such censorship or against any other form of suppression. What is missing from Egypt is a vision for life, including culture. And wherever it comes from, that vision will never come from either arms- or religion-based, ultimately corrupt identity-based power. It will come from a presumably ever widening margin not of protests as such but of social liberalism, whatever form it takes and whoever it happens to be under.
The question remains of what is to be done about the elections. Proactive and community-aware attitudes have resulted in boycotts and strikes being totally ineffective all through the last year and a half. Yet as far as culture goes, at least, the only humane position to take remains refusing to participate in the travesty of democratic transition to which the revolution has been reduced by political power.

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25, 28

Youssef Rakha gives testimony of the first two days

I am asked to write about the recent events in Egypt, and my account will be personal whatever else it is. I saw people die, I saw their killers, I saw commentators – some of them close acquaintances or colleagues – lie about it through their teeth. Inevitably, it will be a tiny portion of what I believe will be the main epic of the Egyptian people for decades to come.

As a journalist I have worked for the most powerful pro-government press establishment in Egypt for nearly 12 years. The position has provided a level of social protection against abuses constantly witnessed on the streets; it has acted as a financial and political buffer, replacing citizenship in a society where citizenship grants few if any rights.By restricting my contribution to cultural and intellectual topics and working in English, at the same time, I have managed to avoid direct involvement in the wholesale distortion, misinformation and sheer incompetence that has made up so much of what went for balance and objectivity on the pages of publications printed by this institution, especially since a new team of chief editors were summarily appointed by the Shura Council in the summer of 2005.

Like many Egyptians, until I saw thousands upon thousands of demonstrators gathered in Maidan at-Tahrir on 25 January – saw that they were neither Islamists nor negligible – and totally identified with them – I was largely sceptical about Egypt having much capacity for true dissent. It is something of a media cliche by now to point out that the opposition was already half oppressed, half co-opted, powerless against the airtight alliance of cannibalistic capitalism and corrupt governance. Even the “banned” Muslim Brothers, of whom I am no supporter, were criminally ousted from parliament during the last elections and had since considered taking to the streets in protest.

Then again, no one suspected that the People’s Assembly was ever a representative body anyway (the same is true of the Press Syndicate, membership of which requires an official position at a government-approved institution by law, and provides little beyond installment plans for the purchase of cars and apartments or reduced-price vacations). Among writers – and in the last six years I have been as much a writer in Arabic as a journalist in English – there remained a sense of relief that (since the people failed repeatedly to show revolutionary oomph) the government, if it did nothing else, could at least keep “the Islamist threat” at bay. As much as western regimes, the traditional intelligentsia was for the longest time duped by fear of theocracy; and to this day protesters and their supporters are emphatically rejecting Khamenei’s blessings.

NDP thugs were known to exist long before they attempted to disband protesters on donkey- and camel-back last Wednesday (2 Feb) – the night on which allegedly sincere and peaceful supporters of Mubarak managed somehow to bombard protesters with tear gas (as well as stones and Molotov cocktails), while snipers stationed on the roofs of the highest buildings waited for the cover of darkness to commit murder  in cold blood – but few outside the Muslim Brotherhood felt they had enough of a stake in the electoral process to object to the thugs’ presence. People knew they had the protection of the police, and no one dreamed they could ever be deployed against peaceful protesters on such a scale – partly because no one dreamed there would ever be peaceful protesters on such a scale. Since 25 January other threats have been held up to Tahrir as well: the threat of chaos, the criminal threat, the constitutional-emptiness threat, the foreign-agenda threat. BS! I have not lost touch with the protests since 25 January and I am grateful that I have lived to witness them.

Egypt’s security apparatus is among the largest and best funded institutions of terror in the world today. It has practised torture, extortion and murder systematically for as long as anyone remembers; and I am grateful that I have lived to see it defeated, humiliated and exposed – and to have contributed, however little, to that glory.

***

Tuesday, 25 Jan. Maidan, the Egyptian word for “square” or “circle” – as opposed to the Syrian-Lebanese word saha, for example – originally means arena or battle front; and during the last week of January many of those to whom Maidan at-Tahrir becomes a home or a second home, partly inspired by the lyrics to a well-known song from the 1970s by the oppositional composer-singer Sheikh Imam Eissa, will start referring to the principal hub of modern Cairo simply as the Maidan: “The brave man is brave, the coward is cowardly/Come on, brave man, let us go into the arena.” In the space of a fortnight the spot at which thousands of younger Egyptians have gathered, contrary to all expectations, will have turned irrevocably into a place of memory, a historical site. Passing the square or hearing about it, people start to wonder whether “this is real”; they are already joining in. Faces and voices are incredulous, but it is true: for once at a political event the number of demonstrators is actually greater than the number of Central Security troops restricting their movement and ready to subdue them by force; for once a political event is taking place in the open, in a central space, lasting all day and well into the night. Of course, by Saturday 29 Jan, Tahrir will have turned into a maidan in every sense possible.

Central Security is a branch of the military placed at the disposal of the Ministry of Interior for purposes roughly equivalent to those of the riot police. Best known for their unthinking violence, they tend to be army conscripts from working-class provincial backgrounds (less legally, army conscripts in the form of  guards are also routinely employed in the service of police officer’s families, buying groceries for the madam and using the state-owned police vans popularly known as el box to transport the children to school); directed by loyal commanders, Central Security do what they are told; and along with legal complications regarding the right to peaceful protest, emergency law (which in practise allows any member of the police to arrest and indefinitely detain any member of the public), and possible intervention from the notorious (plainclothes, highly skilled and practically autonomous) State Security, they have been a sufficient disincentive up to this point. Yet none of it stops people, thousands and tens of thousands, from flocking to Tahrir now – all of it in response to a seemingly stray Internet call for solidarity and anger?

The initial demonstration was announced on the popular Facebook Page called “We Are All Khalid Said” (a reference to one young man who died in the process of being brutalised by a low-rank policeman on the streets of Alexandria, without charge, on 6 June 2010). It was started by a young man “of good family”, to translate the classist Egyptian expression ibn nass, well-off and internationally connected, a product of the global economy and the kind of sheltered upbringing that produces conscientious and well-meaning geeks. Born in 1980, Wael Ghoneim is Google’s Middle East  marketing manager. (On Sunday he will be kidnapped by State Security and held, blindfolded, in secret confinement until the next Monday, when he made a powerful appearance on Egyptian satellite television.) For months the Page worked loosely in liaison with four online movements – April 6, Youth for Justice and Freedom, Hshd and the Popular Front for Freedom – as well as the El Baradei Campaign, the Muslim Brothers (who will keep an admirably low profile despite playing a very significant role in the survival of the Tahrir community) and the Democratic Front Party.

The demonstration was planned, with truly poetic irony, to coincide with Police Day, a national holiday commemorating a major act of heroism by Egyptian police troops besieged by British forces in Ismailia on the eve of the coup d’etat-turned-revolution of 1952. I am among the majority who think 25 January will come to nothing, but by evening I too have trouble holding back tears. There are clear signs of life in the long dead body of my true constituency – political participation by sheer force of right – and it is not driven by any (inevitably suspect) political programme. It is sincere, it is civilised, it is tidy, it is – and this too has mattered to me throughout – cool.

That evening I leave Tahrir around 11.30 pm. People are singing, bearing signs, lying in circles on the asphalt. They are predominantly young and secular. Even Central Security guards, with smiles on their faces, are humming the most popular slogan, adopted from the revolution in Tunisia: ash-sha’b yureed isqaat an-nidham (the people want to bring down the regime). A group of protesters surround one young man in what appears to be a standoff; they prevail on him to remove stones from his pockets. “Whoever throws a stone belongs with them,” I hear one of them say, referring to the security forces stationed at one entryway near by, “not us.”

Outside Tahrir the traffic proceeds normally; there is a sense of danger and excitement, the area surrounding the square is sealed off, but traffic proceeds more or less normally. I have barely arrived home when I find out that, desperate to disband protesters intent on spending the night in Tahrir, Central Security has attacked the demonstrators with tear gas, rubber and live pellets, canes and armoured trucks. A friend of mine ends up with 63 pellets lodged in his body; at least five friends of mine – two of them award-winning writers – are mercilessly beaten; in the next two days there will be numerous, more or less brief arrests, notably outside the Supreme Court near the Press and Lawyers syndicates. By 1 am the Maidan is more or less empty, and despite continuing demonstrations in the area and news of extremely violent confrontations in Suez – led by Alexandria and Cairo, the entire country is rising up – things appear to have quietened somewhat for the next two days. They are not over.

***

Tuesday 1 Feb, when a million people under protection of the army establish the virtually independent City of Tahrir – a fully functional and demographically varied community whose population at the time of writing has not dropped below 30,000 for a minute since Saturday 29 Jan – is still a long way off. At the time of writing pro-Mubarak demonstrations, announced repeatedly since then, have fizzled out to nothing after it transpired that they were invariably penetrated by criminal elements and police, directed not by popular will but by official and business interests. In times of need a decades-old dictatorship relies on the poverty, dependency and ignorance it has spent so much on cultivating – but lies can only go so far once the barrier of fear is broken. Already on Tuesday people who have been to the Maidan believe they are inhaling cleaner air, to the point where some of them are wondering whether it is because the numbers of vehicles in the area have significantly dropped.

***

Friday, 28 Jan. Of the many different fumes potent enough to induce a significant state change that I have experienced in my own body, I now have an additional one to give me flashbacks: tear gas. For someone who has never tried it, where a sufficient amount is inhaled, the effect is fiercely disorienting. Stinging sensations all over the face are accompanied by a temporary inability to breathe, and eyes – already clouding over – seem to reflect the death throes of the victim. Soda on the eyes and onion or vinegar soaked fabric on the nose: from that day I can count at least 30 young men crying out, standing or lying prone on their backs, wondering whether they were about to die. Solidarity among the demonstrators was instant and absolute; among the most touching remarks I heard exchanged in the entryways of residential buildings was, “Don’t panic, just don’t panic. It only lasts five minutes.”

It was on Friday 28 January, with both internet connections and mobile phone lines completely cut off all across the country, that I set out to the site of the oldest mosque in Egypt in Misr Al-Qadima, Jami’ ‘Amr, where one of many demonstrations planned for this, Angry Friday (I would personally call it Liberation Friday, but that is not the point), was to set off after the weekly group prayers. There were four of us on the Metro, all writers. Before we arrived at Mar Girgis, the two women put on headscarves and separated from my friend and me. At the entrance we asked a young man where the women’s section was. “I don’t know,” he said, with a strange look in his eyes. “This is my first time here.”

That look, the desperate determination it expressed, the all but suicidal readiness to effect change it communicated silently across classes, cultural backgrounds, even political orientations, will no doubt remain among the most defining experiences of my life.

For close on half an hour we endured a Friday sermon in which we were prevailed on to avoid sedition and, where our just demands were not met on earth, wait for the reward in the hereafter. The ameen that follows each request at the end was all but inaudible when the imam mentioned the name of Mubarak. It was not clear whether calls for protest would be met in sufficient numbers here of all places, particularly in the absence of the ability to confirm them. I am secular, not a practising Muslim, but I performed my prayers devoutly and did all I could to reach out to God. No sooner had the prayers ended than the cheering sound of hundreds chanting in unison emerged from the deepest point in the mosque, with people elsewhere rushing to join the fast forming block of people that would exit the premises as one: Islamists, human rights activists, conscientious geeks. By the time we reached the main street we had lost our female companions, and Central Security were already firing peremptory tear gas. My friend and I ended up in isolation from intellectuals and activists; until we departed Misr Al-Qadima, we were among everyday working-class people for the most part, chanting the slogans adopted all across Egypt, avoiding Central Security violence and occasionally attempting to stay violent responses to it, sharing carbonated beverages with which we splashed our eyes to reduce the effect of the tear gas, sharing water, scarves, what food there was, and cigarettes, as well as helping the injured off the ground calling on the demonstrators not to scatter.

In Misr Al-Qadima I saw uneducated 15-year-old girls brave enough to face Central Security head on, shouting “Down with Mubarak”; I saw a mechanic nudge his friend: “Are you from South Africa, man? Why aren’t you joining in!” I saw elderly women patting the backs of demonstrators and muttering, “God grant you victory.” Then my friend and I, having stopped at a cafe where Al Jazeera was broadcasting reassuring news from all over the city, set out towards downtown. It was 2 pm.

The idea was to walk, through Ain Al-Seerah and Majra Al-‘Uyoun, to Qasr Al-‘Aini Street and whence to Tahrir, where we realised the main battle had already started and where State Security were deploying fire hoses in addition to everything else. Little did we know that the very simple business of traversing this thoroughfare on foot would take up the rest of the day and night. I will cite only two moments from that period of the day: the arrival at the Majra Al-‘Uyoun end of Qasr Al-‘Aini – where we converged with thousands arriving from Maadi – and the point at which, sitting next to me on the steps of one residential building, his face soaked, one little boy who could not have been older than five or six from the near-by neighbourhood of Sayed Zainab said, “I want to go home.” Replaced by others, people would take refuge in the side streets and the buildings, but they always came back out.

Hours and hours. Slogans, attempts to win over Central Security, squabbles with the neighbours. The sight of thousands of unarmed young men taking over the streets together, their heads raised, chanting to the balconies as they passed Enzell, enzell (“Come down, come down!”) and of people throwing apples and bottles of mineral water to them, of other young men taking of their pyjamas and rushing inside to join them: I will die proud of having been part of that sight.

By evening, while still firing pellets and tear gas, Central Security will have fled; some of them returned individually to hunt down stone-throwing protesters on the streets of Garden City one by one, their guns loaded with live ammunition. Violence had broken out after a white car with diplomatic plates ran down some 12 people while it drove past at 120 km per hour, reportedly killing four. Thankfully, before I took refuge in a friend’s house in Garden City, I managed to phone my mother to tell her I was alive and well; I did not tell her that people were being shot point blank while President Mubarak gave his first, vastly disappointing speech, speaking of “the safety and the security of Egypt’s youth”, the very people who were being killed in order for him to stay in power.

Later, not so much later, we will find out about the inexplicable and absolute disappearance of the police; most of us will take it as a sign of our victory in a battle we joined without arms. Friends were hosed down while praying on Qasr Al-Nil Bridge, beaten to death, run down by armoured cars. But in the end the Maidan had been completely occupied by the people – for the first time since 1952 there is a truly public space in Cairo, a space with a voice and a will. Equally importantly, the police were humiliatingly defeated. I believe I will always remember the cowardice and brutality of State Security, the hysteria and determination of my fellow Egyptians.

As a writer, as a journalist, Friday 28 January has given me back my public voice. It has confirmed to me the existence of a homeland and a people of which I am part. All I ask of the security apparatus at this point is that, if they are going to bomb us with tear-gas, they should at least use tear-gas that is not older than the expiry date inscribed on the cannisters.

 

Wednesday, 10 February, 2011

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